Autobiographical memory and amnesia: using conceptual knowledge to ground the self by Rathbone, Clare J. et al.
	Memory and self in amnesia	2


Running head:  Memory and self in amnesia
Autobiographical memory and amnesia: using conceptual knowledge to ground the self





































Autobiographical memory and amnesia: using conceptual knowledge to ground the self
Traditionally, autobiographical memories are considered to be the basis for our sense of self. This idea extends back to philosophers such as Locke, who claimed that the self exists entirely as a result of the process of memory (Locke, 1694/1975). From this rather stark viewpoint, it follows that a person who cannot recall their past will have no sense of identity. Over the years, psychological research, particularly in the field of cognitive neuropsychology, has challenged this Lockean model of the self (Claparède, 1911/1951; Klein et al., 2002b; Medved & Brockmeier, 2008; Rosenbaum et al., 2005; Steinvorth et al., 2005; Wheeler & McMillan, 2001). This paper builds on the body of research in this area, to suggest that the self can indeed be known in the absence of episodic memories, and that neuropsychological cases of amnesia can help explain how. 
The self can be considered as cognitive structure that plays an executive role in mental processing, and enables one to be consciously aware of knowledge about themselves and autobiographical memories from their lives. A recent cognitive model of the relationship between self and memory is the Self-Memory System (SMS) (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), which views episodic memories and the more semantic, conceptual autobiographical knowledge (such as where one went to school) as discrete systems that both operate bi-directionally with the working self. The working self is a control mechanism that employs the transient goals of the self to govern autobiographical retrieval. Equally, the working self is constrained by the memories and knowledge within the autobiographical knowledge base (Conway, 2005). Subsets of autobiographical knowledge and episodic memories can be viewed as supporting particular self-images, such as being a father or an optimistic person. Arguably, a conscious awareness of having a set of these self-images might help to give rise to a sense of self. Research has shown that memories cued by self images tend to cluster temporally around the time the self-image was considered to have emerged (Rathbone et al., 2008), suggesting that different aspects of the conceptual self are supported by relevant collections of autobiographical memories (for a more detailed account of the complex relationship between self-images and associated memories, see Rathbone et al., 2008). These self-images, and the memories that support them, have been investigated in normal adult populations. However, as previous researchers have noted, questions relating to the understanding of cognitive phenomena can be addressed in a uniquely enlightening way through the study of neuropsychological cases (Klein et al., 2002b); the ultimate test of how episodic memory constrains the self is to see how profound deficits in the former influence the latter. 
Focal retrograde amnesia (FRA) is an organic-based memory loss, restricted to the period of time prior to trauma. As noted by several researchers (Klein et al., 1996; Wheeler & McMillan, 2001), FRA is particularly relevant to the study of differences between semantic and episodic memory as many case studies have revealed a dissociation between these memory systems (Cermak & O'Connor, 1983; Conway & Fthenaki, 2003; Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; Tulving et al., 1988).  Broadly speaking, semantic memory is memory for facts that are known about the world, whereas episodic memories are personally experienced events that can be remembered, as though mentally time-traveling to the past (Tulving, 1983; Wheeler & McMillan, 2001; Wheeler et al., 1997).     
Understanding of this distinction in amnesia dates back to the work of Claparède (1911/1951), in which a patient is described who has lost the ability to recall events in her past and link them with a continuous sense of self. The presence of a ‘self’ in mental representations of the past is surely the essence of an episodic autobiographical memory (Kihlstrom, 1995). Claparède viewed episodic retrieval as necessarily invoking some sense of self in the past (similar to Tulving’s concept of ‘mental time travel’; Tulving, 1983), an idea which anticipates the current view of the self as a cognitive structure that plays an executive role in mental processing (Kihlstrom, 1995; Kihlstrom et al., 2002; Klein et al., 2002a; Klein & Kihlstrom, 1986; Klein et al., 1996). In a review of cases, Wheeler and McMillan (2001) show that the majority of people with FRA reveal differential impact on episodic and semantic memory function. In particular, the authors note several cases whereby autobiographical episodic details were impaired, but autobiographical semantic knowledge was preserved. For example, they cite the case of a woman who knew her house had been burgled on two occasions, but could not recall any episodic details associated with the events (Evans et al., 1996). 
Another case of a selectively episodic-impaired amnesic was reported by Klein, Loftus and Kihlstrom (1996). WJ experienced a concussive blow that caused her to forget the episodic details of the seven months pre-trauma. During her amnesia and following her full recovery, WJ was asked to describe herself and her personality during her first term at university (the time which was inaccessible by memory). In spite of changes in memory performance, WJ’s descriptions of herself did not alter at all over multiple testing times, suggesting that the self can be known without autobiographical retrieval. It is possible that WJ drew on memories of herself before the amnesic period, and used these memories to report a stable self (Klein et al., 2002b), however, other cases have shown that accurate self knowledge can be generated even in the presence of a severely pervasive amnesia covering all autobiographical memories. Patient KC’s amnesia prevented him from recalling a single experienced event, but Tulving (1993) found he was able to accurately rate traits for self-descriptiveness over two separate occasions, and that these ratings were consistent with those his mother generated to rate his personality. KC was able to know accurate semantic facts about his conceptual self, without being able to call on any specific instances to support his assertions (Tulving, 1993). 
Another well-documented amnesic case is that of Clive Wearing, who was reported to exist in a world in which he was perpetually stuck in the present (Wilson et al., 1995; Wilson & Wearing, 1995). His amnesia was so extensive that he remained unaware that there had been any days previous to the current one, and his conscious recollection lasted no more than a couple of minutes. His scores on the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI) (Kopelman et al., 1989), were abnormal across all lifetime periods, for both semantic and autobiographical retrieval.  Although Clive remembered little of his life, some semantic memories remained, such as what A-levels he got, and the number plates of his father’s cars. Interestingly, he did know he was a musician, and apparently got irritated by simple questions about differentiating between different pitches in the Seashore Test of Musical Abilities (Seashore et al., 1960), stating incredulously ‘I am a world famous musician!’ (Wilson & Wearing, 1995). Furthermore, despite having no memory for his married life, Clive recognised his wife when she walked in the room, and would presumably therefore have known himself to be a husband. Arguably, Clive has a profound disturbance of the self – he wrote in one of his diaries ‘I am completely incapable of thinking’ (p.17, Wilson and Wearing, 1995). However, Clive is able to know certain facts about himself -that he is a musician, a husband and has profound impairment. We would suggest that in spite of the severity of his amnesia, he possesses self-knowledge. 
Another case, PS, experienced a severe retrograde amnesia following a thalamic stroke (McCarthy & Hodges, 1995). During the AMI, PS was unable to produce a single autobiographical event from any lifetime period, but was able to generate some semantic facts for earlier in his life. When asked to generate autobiographical memories to cue words such as ‘house’ and ‘book’ in the Crovitz-Schiffman task (Crovitz & Schiffman, 1974), PS was unable to produce episodic memories and gave facts instead (McCarthy & Hodges, 1995). Most striking perhaps, was the fact that PS believed he was on shore leave from active service in the Navy. In fact, PS had left the Navy in 1946, at least 43 years prior to the onset of his amnesia. PS lived with the belief that England was at war, and frequently mentioned blackouts and food rationing. McCarthy and Hodges suggest that PS may have become trapped in the lifetime period of his Naval years for psychological or neuroanatomical reasons. Psychologically, they propose PS could have assumed his wartime naval self, because this reflects a time most similar to his present condition of personal disruption and lack of control. Neuroanatomically, they suggest that perhaps there is something physiologically special about the memories of early adulthood. We would suggest a further possibility. We believe memories from early adulthood are indeed special, in that they support the formation of adult identity and enable the grounding of a consistent self (e.g. Fizgerald, 1988; 1992).  Perhaps this key period of identity formation in PS’s life was drawn upon in the face of severe amnesia, in order to provide crucial support for the maintenance of some kind of personal identity.  
Klein, Rozendal and Cosmides (2002) cite cases such as those described above to propose that the apparent preservation of self knowledge in the absence of supporting memory structures suggests that there is something ‘special’ about the self. For a healthily functioning mind, it is important to maintain a stable, coherent sense of self that persists through time (Conway, 2005). If amnesia impairs episodic retrieval, the working self might revert to what is available and use conceptual semantic information to give rise to a sense of identity, and to maintain knowledge of a ‘conceptual self’ (Conway, Singer and Tagini, 2004). 
In summary, several case studies identify a complex relationship between memory and self in amnesia, and through anecdotal reports, assessment of personality variables, and tests of conceptual knowledge, it appears that it is possible to maintain a sense of self, in spite of severe episodic amnesia. We present our amnesic case report, with results from neuropsychological tests and standard measures of autobiographical retrieval (the Crovitz Shiffman Task and AMI).  We then describe data obtained using our IAM Task [I Am Memory Task; Rathbone, Moulin and Conway (2008)].   This is the first application of this self and memory task to a neuropsychological case.  Our aims were to explore how the self is perceived in amnesia, whether self concepts can be used to cue memories, and how self concepts (such as being a mother) are maintained in the absence of key episodic memories to support them.  
Case Report
PJM, a 38 year old right-handed female, suffered a TBI at age 35 in the summer of 2005 as a result of a bicycle accident. This injury left her in a coma for several weeks, and she spent about six months in hospital. On regaining consciousness, PJM experienced partial loss of vision, difficulty using the right-hand side of her body, and severe short-term and long-term memory loss. After returning home from hospital in early 2006, PJM’s short term memory gradually improved but she was unable to return to her job as an academic, unable to drive, and was living a very different life to that before her accident. She also had a self-reported persistent retrograde amnesia for a period of approximately 18 months prior to her TBI. This period of amnesia covered several key events in PJM’s life, such as deciding to have a second child, the birth of that child, and a move to a new house. As PJM put it: “we must have chosen to move here, because we needed more space. But I have no memory of choosing to move here… I remember my life up until a couple of years ago… it’s weird that the accident just sort of knocked out the two years before it.” As PJM’s amnesia covered these important life experiences of events important to one’s sense of identity (Erikson, 1950), we were motivated to investigate how PJM’s sense of self might have been affected by her amnesia. 
Neuropsychological Tests
Table 1 shows PJM’s scores across a standard battery of neuropsychological tests, dated from between November 2005 and September 2006, four to 14 months post injury (while PJM was aged 36).
Insert Table 1 about here
Table 1 demonstrates clear episodic memory difficulties, with scaled scores for memory subscales of the Weschler Memory Scale (WMS; Wechsler, 1945) all below 10.  Note that short-term memory, as measured by subscales of Weschler Adult Intellignence Scale (WAIS; (Wechsler, 1981) is normal. The WAIS score is probably below the level we would expect for someone of PJM’s education level and career, but on the whole scores are in the normal range.  The similarities and picture completion scores suggest some difficulties with reasoning, although for the latter test it is likely that this score was affected by PJM’s visual difficulties.  The tests of executive function are all in the normal range.  Note that PJM’s memory difficulties produce low scores on tests with pictorial, verbal and story materials.  In short, PJM is an intelligent woman with perhaps some minor difficulties with reasoning subscales of the WAIS, but otherwise a clear and isolated memory deficit.
Autobiographical Memory Measures
In order to assess autobiographical retrieval, PJM completed the AMI and a modified version of the Crovitz-Schiffman Task. In the AMI, overall scores revealed a personal semantic score of 50/63, and an autobiographical incidents score of 13/27. These results suggest that PJM’s personal semantic memory was ‘borderline’, whilst her ability to retrieve specific autobiographical memories from across the lifespan was ‘probably abnormal’. A breakdown of these scores across lifetime periods is shown in Table 2. These show that although the period just before the accident was severely affected by amnesia, PJM was still able to retrieve specific memories from her recent lifetime period. However, specific memories from childhood were harder to generate, and no memories at all were given for the period at secondary school (11-18), even when prompts were given. Perhaps surprisingly, results suggest that it is the impaired retrieval for autobiographical memories in the childhood period that has led to the ‘probably abnormal’ overall autobiographical incident score, rather than a lack of memories for the recent past.  Note that personal semantic scores are of the same level across all three time periods.
Insert Table 2 about here
In order to explore how PJM visualized her recall across the lifespan, we presented her with a blank graph, depicting years of age on the X axis and ease of memory recall across the Y axis (scale 1 to 5; 1 = hard to recall memories, 5 = easy). PJM’s task was to indicate, in one continuous line, a general picture of how she felt her memory was for different times in her life. This self-produced lifespan retrieval curve is shown in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 about here
Interestingly PJM’s retrieval curve (Fig. 1) reflects the standard pattern of childhood amnesia (a paucity of memories in early childhood) and increased retrieval through adolescence. We also see that PJM feels her memory retrieval dropped sharply to zero for the period around the time of the accident (ages 35 to 38). In order to explore this more objectively (and as the AMI only probes a small number of memories per epoch), we carried out a modified version of the Crovitz-Schiffman task. This version asked PJM to title, date and rate memories cued by 20 high frequency nouns. No prompts were given. The rating system was based on the scores used to measure self-defining memories (Singer, 1998), and asked for a rating of vividness, emotionality and regularity of recall from 1 to 10 (1 = low; 10 = high). PJM found it impossible to produce any memories for 7 out of the 20 cue words on the modified Crovitz-Schiffman task. PJM described there being ‘some words she just couldn’t think of any memories for’, stating for example: ‘Restaurant, yes, I remember lots of restaurants, but there’s no one memory I can think of.’ When responses were given, they often reflected conceptual knowledge or repeated and generic events, rather than specific autobiographical memories. For example, for the cue ‘Letter’, PJM responded: I used to write to Kirstin after I moved. Of the 13 memory titles provided, ten were classed as generic, and only three as episodic. This tendency to respond using generic memories explains the apparent contrast between the Crovitz task results (which show a preservation of childhood memories for the ages 11 to 20) and the AMI (which reveals a deficit over this time period). Table 2 indicates that for the childhood period in the AMI, scores are only low for the autobiographical incidents measure; whilst personal semantic memories are more readily generated.  PJM’s average rating scores for memories generated in the Crovtiz-Schiffman task are shown in Table 3, alongside a control group of 14 females (mean age = 49, range 28-59) drawn from existing data from our laboratory.
Insert Table 3 about here
PJM’s ratings were slightly lower for regularity of recall, and far lower for emotionality and vividness, compared with the control group. We inspected PJM’s by calculating z scores relative to the control’s mean and standard deviation (emotionality z = -2.21; vividness z = -2.21; regularity of retrieval z = -1.32). These suggest that her mean ratings of emotionality and vividness clearly reflect her memory difficulties, and the regularity by which she retrieves the memory is somewhat lower than is usual. We examined the distribution of PJM’s autobiographical retrieval compared with the control sample.  To account for missing data, proportional scores were calculated (as the proportion of each participant’s memories that fell in each epoch).  Memory frequency by 5 year epoch is shown in Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 about here
As the control participants were of an older age than PJM, their memory distribution is spread further across the lifespan. However, Figure 2 shows that PJM’s memories match the control group distribution by following a reminiscence bump pattern. The reminiscence bump is a robust phenomenon in which people over 40 tend to recall most memories from adolescence and early adulthood (D. C. Rubin et al., 1998; D.C. Rubin et al., 1986). We would expect PJM’s reminiscence bump to be more pronounced, as she is only sampling from the earlier portion of the lifespan. 
This presents something of an interesting contrast in the findings from the AMI and our experimental task.  Where the AMI indicates a deficit of autobiographical memory in adolescence, the lifespan retrieval curve indicates that a higher proportion of PJM’s memories, when cued by a single word, rather than a lifetime period, come from the between the ages of 11 and 20. Our explanation for this is that PJM’s reminiscence bump is produced from retrieving semantic autobiographical knowledge from her life rather than producing episodic memories of specific events as are required in the AMI.  Indeed, studies have shown that semantic memories follow the same reminiscence bump pattern as episodic memories (Rybash & Monaghan, 1999). At this stage we tentatively suggest that PJM has the standard lifespan retrieval curve when asked to generate memories from her life, but that the fundamental nature of these memories is different.  Rather than being episodic memories, she produces a set of facts and generic events. This is illustrated through comparison of PJM’s short, factual responses, such as to the cue ‘Letter’ (described above) with typical control responses to the cue Letter: "Letter from HM Dockyard Portsmouth I had passed entrance exam with good marks", and  “Letter from the wife of a long term friend to tell me her husband had Alzheimer's”. PJM’s apparent semanticising of memories into facts, contrasting with standard control responses to cues, led us to examine how PJM might use memories to support her sense of self. 
IAM Task 
Previous research (Rathbone et al., 2008) has shown that people are able to generate and date autobiographical memories that are associated with freely generated aspects of self, using the I Am Memory Task (IAM Task). In this task the participant is asked to generate four selves (e.g. ‘I am a singer’) using a shortened version of Kuhn and McPartland’s (1954) Twenty Statements Test, and then generate eight memories associated with each self. After autobiographical retrieval, participants go back and date all the memories and provide an age at which each self became a defining part of their identity –an age of self emergence. Results have consistently shown that dates of self-cued memories cluster around the time that particular self emerged, suggesting that autobiographical memories are used to support the self. Following the standard procedure, PJM generated four I am statements: ‘I am a mum’, ‘I am active’, ‘I am academic’, and ‘I am the survivor of an accident’. She was then asked to provide eight autobiographical memories that she felt reflected each of the identity statements given (32 in total). PJM was only able to think of between two and five memories for each self (generating 15 in total), and as she herself noted, they were mostly things she knew about each identity, not memories of specific events (e.g. “I have those *facts* I can tell you, not 'memories'” [her asterisks]). No prompting was given for either I am statements or memories. The memories were then dated by PJM, and lastly she dated the age at which each of the four I am statements became self-defining. Using age of emergence as a central point, all memories were then recoded as a number of years before (negative) or after (positive) the emergence of their related self. Thus, a memory from age 36 which related to ‘I am a mum,’ which emerged at age 32, would be recoded as 4. Using an all female control group selected from existing data from our laboratory, with similar age (n=12, mean age= 43.7, age range = 39-47), we were able to compare the clustering of memories around self emergence in PJM and a control sample. To account for missing values in PJM’s data set, all memories were analysed as proportional data (as the proportion of each participant’s memories that fell in each epoch). These data are shown in Figure 3.
Insert Fig. 3 about here
Again, after accounting for the fact that the control sample is slightly older than PJM (and thus has more memories in epochs over 15 years after age of self emergence), the pattern of results is similar. Both PJM and controls show a distinct clustering pattern, with most of their memories coming from the 5 years before and after age of self emergence. Admittedly, one would expect PJMs memories to cluster tightly for identities linked with being ‘a mum’ and ‘the survivor of an accident’ as these aspects of self were formed in very recent years allowing little room for memories to spread out. However, memories of being academic and active (which were formed at younger ages of 26 and 24 respectively) have also produced memories that are strongly temporally linked with times those selves emerged. 
As stated above, PJM found it difficult to give episodic memories related to each self, and instead produced autobiographical facts. By way of example, for the self ‘I am a mum’ PJM generated this memory: At first I didn’t know child #2 was mine. She was 8 months old when I had my accident, and I thought she was lovely, but just ‘our friend.’  Similarly, for being an academic, PJM recalled: Then I worked in France. I had a flat on my own, had to drive my car (a white Citroen Visa!) through to work, and I used to drink in an Irish pub (with staff who spoke English!). However, some memories do have more episodic features, such as a description of her feelings during a phone call in which her then boyfriend (now husband) told her he was going to work in South Africa. Nonetheless, the general impression is that episodic memories are unavailable, and lists of autobiographical semantic facts or descriptions of repeated and generic acts were by far the most frequent form of response.
Thus, other than finding it harder to produce memories cued by I am statements (giving 15 rather than the usual 32), and despite the production of semantic rather than episodic memories, PJM’s pattern of results differs little from that of the controls. The temporal clustering of memories supporting particular selves emerges, despite the fact that PJM appears to mostly only be able to generate semantic memories to self cues. To illustrate this, and PJM’s insight into the mechanisms of her own memory functioning, we include this excerpt from an email communication: 

“I met my husband through joining the caving club at university, but I have no *memories* I can sum up. Fact: my first cave was a trip down Swildon's Hole, with hubby on the trip. I don't have any 'memories' I can talk about about it, although I do remember the facts. [asterisks her own]”

PJM is clearly able to know her identity. She can list aspects of her sense of self, and, even without episodic memories to support them, can generate semantic facts that enable her to know these identities are true.  Note also, that she generates a fact from a first-time experience.  In our view, PJM’s sense of self may be based predominantly on conceptual knowledge rather than episodic memory, but we think that those conceptual facts are distributed in the same way as episodic details in healthy people. Addis and Tippett (2008) suggest that both episodic and semantic memory systems give rise to identity. They propose that personal episodic memory enables the phenomenological continuity of identity, whilst personal semantic memory plays a role in the narrative continuity of identity. The nature of personal narratives depends on highly conceptual and ‘story-like’ information about one’s life, which resides at the general event level of autobiographical memory and is thus unlikely to rely on more event-specific episodic systems.
The IAM task reported here only required participants to produce four I am statements. However, we were interested in the way PJM would define her identity more broadly. To this end, PJM completed the standard Twenty-Statements Test, (TST; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), which asks participants to complete 20 statements that begin with I am. PJM responded with 12 statements, reflecting concrete identities (e.g. being a mother, a geologist, and a caver) and trait-like abstract identities (e.g. a worrier, a lovely person). Although she was unable to complete the task, PJM’s statements are similar to the range of selves given by participants across a range of studies using this task. It is possible that PJM produced fewer statements than controls as a result of different test conditions. Whilst PJM completed the task at home in her own time, control participants did the task with the experimenter in a laboratory; a context that might have increased controls’ efforts to finish the task (which can take up to 20 minutes). When asked to rate each self out of ten for personal significance (10 indicating that self is central to defining identity), PJM marked the first four selves in the list as the most important (between 6 and 8 in importance to identity). This pattern of listing most important selves first is matched in previous studies with student populations, and indicates again that PJM’s sense of self is not disordered, and is similar to that of controls. Previous research using the TST as an identity measure in clinical groups, has shown that Alzheimer’s patients generated fewer statements, that were more vague, than controls (Addis & Tippett, 2004). Furthermore, the work of Addis and Tippett correlated the degraded sense of self found in Alzheimer’s patients with a deficit in both episodic and semantic memory, particularly in early adulthood. Our data suggests that, in spite of PJM’s memory impairments, she is still able to describe aspects of her sense of self, and subjectively experiences this sense of self coherently and with temporal continuity. This case, however, clearly reflects a very different pattern of memory loss, compared with the global cognitive impairments associated with Alzheimer’s disease that might indeed pose more of a threat to the integrity of the self.
Finally, we compared the pattern of self emergence across the lifespan with a control sample. Previous research has shown that selves tend to emerge in a pattern that follows the reminiscence bump (Rathbone et al., 2008), in that most selves emerge in late adulthood and early adolescence. Figure 4 shows that PJM’s selves emerge in a similar pattern to that of controls, with selves revealing a peak in emergence between 26 and 30 years of age. The emergence of selves later in the lifespan for the control group reflects the older age of this sample (n=59, mean age = 54, range: 39 to 76).  Overall, results suggest that PJM knows her sense of self, that her aspects of self are considered to have emerged at times in line with control participants, and there has been no ‘loss of identity’ as a result of her autobiographical deficit.  In fact, she reports acquiring new selves in the period aged 31 to 40, where in comparison, in Figure 1, she indicates profound memory difficulties during this period, and we collected no memories from this period using the Crovitz technique (Figure 2).
Insert Fig. 4 about here
One might consider a life-threatening accident to drastically change one’s sense of self, even if autobiographical memory loss does not contribute to an actual loss of identity (note that PJM generates this concept as one of her I am statements). Indeed studies have shown that changes to sense of self are common after periods of illness and memory loss (Frank, 1995; Nochi, 1998). PJM’s husband wrote an article on a television drama’s portrayal of amnesia, and spoke of the adaptations needed when a spouse changes, even if temporarily, from a partner to a dependent (Knell, 2007). However, in spite of the obvious lifestyle changes that resulted from the accident, there is no suggestion that PJM feels like a changed person. When asked if she felt like she was the same person after the accident as before, and that a sense of continuity of identity ran through this period, PJM replied ‘oh yes’, and said she never felt as though her identity was missing, even in the period just after the accident. In fact, she and her husband drew upon her characteristic pre-accident fighting spirit, and PJM went on to return to work in early 2007, and ran the London Marathon in support of Headway​[1]​ in 2008.
Discussion
The aims of this research were to explore how the self is perceived in amnesia, whether self concepts can be used to cue memories, and how self concepts might be maintained without access to episodic memories associated with those selves. Firstly, it appears that PJM’s self concept is coherent and stable. She produced fewer identity statements than controls (although, as suggested earlier, this might reflect differences in the test environment), but the 12 produced demonstrated a selection of normal concrete and abstract identities. Objectively measuring how normal someone’s sense of self is poses challenges, particularly in light of the subjective nature of the self. PJM herself anecdotally reported feeling no ‘loss of self’ as a result of her accident or memory loss. Admittedly, a failure to detect a loss or change in something does not mean that there is no loss (anosognosia provides a case in point; Babinski, 1914). However, in the case of knowledge about the highly subjective self, it is arguable that to feel one has a coherent sense of self means one does have a coherent sense of self. For the purposes of investigation more objective measures are needed, and to this end the TST also suggests that PJM’s self-concepts differ little from those of controls. Other than producing fewer identity statements, PJM reported aspects of her identity that were qualitatively comparable and similarly ranked for importance and age of emergence to controls. As PJM’s sense of self appears to rely mainly on conceptual semantic memories, whilst normal individuals probably use a combination of both semantic and episodic memories (e.g. Addis and Tippett, 2008), it is arguable that her sense of self might be different in some way to those without amnesia. However, it appears that PJM’s self is essentially coherent and generally similar to those of controls, in contrast to the marked differences in the memory processes measured. 
PJM was able to produce some memories linked with self concepts, but these tended to be conceptual in nature. As mentioned previously, patient PS was unable to produce episodic memories to cue words on the Crovitz-Schiffman task, and gave semantic facts instead (McCarthy & Hodges, 1995). This is similar to the responses given by PJM in the Crovitz-Schiffman task and AMI. For example, when asked to recall an autobiographical incident from the period prior to starting school in the AMI, PJM responded ‘we used to have dogs.’ As language ability was not assessed, one could suggest that PJM’s memory impairment might be associated with language difficulties (in light of established links between language ability and autobiographical memory performance; e.g. Burke & Mackay, 1997; Conway, 2005). However, at the time of completing the experimental tasks, PJM had already returned to her job as an academic, and thus it is unlikely that she was experiencing any severe difficulties with naming, fluency or grammar. Psychopathology and visual ability were also not assessed (factors which have been linked with autobiographical memory; e.g. Lemogne et al., 2006; Rubin and Greenberg, 1998), and whilst these would be interesting avenues to consider in future applications of this paradigm, we feel that PJM’s episodic memory deficits can be reliably linked back to the retrograde amnesia that occurred following her brain injury. Thus, we go on to discuss how autobiographical knowledge might be used to support the self in the absence of episodic retrieval.
We suggest that, for PJM, semantic facts constituting the autobiographical knowledge of Conway’s (2005) lifetime periods and general events (which, as described, are often preserved in amnesia), may have taken the role of supporting the self. PJM knows who she is because she knows she married her husband and is thus a wife; she knows she did a PhD and works in academia. Even without specific memories of the birth of her second child, PJM has a perfectly accessible, coherent sense that she is the mother of her child. Thus, we propose that the self can be known, as coherent and stable through time, through conceptual autobiographical knowledge about the self. This view is depicted in the simplified version of the SMS model (Conway, 2005) shown in Figure 5. 
Insert Fig. 5 about here
In the healthy individual, both semantic and episodic autobiographical memories will give rise to and govern the working self. However, it appears that the self can remain stable and coherent using semantic facts alone. It is assumed that maintaining a stable, coherent self, that is grounded in knowledge of the past, reflects a healthy state (Conway, 2005). It is thus likely that a self-knowledge system that cannot draw on episodic event specific knowledge to support the self will resort to other means. 
This proposal is echoed by recent qualitative research into continuity and organization of self knowledge in amnesic patients (Medved & Brockmeier, 2008). Findings revealed that in spite of extensive changes to lifestyle and everyday functioning, patients felt a strong sense of a continuous self. Medved and Brockmeier reported that participants drew on whatever resources they could in telling stories of their identities. In the absence of their own episodic memories they would appropriate the memories of others, or simply speculate on their own inability to recall things, by way of generating a sense of self. These findings reiterate the feeling that the self will be preserved by any means possible.  We interpret PJM’s self concepts and facts, although based on general impressions and semantic knowledge, as being distributed in the same way across the lifespan, and in relation to self formation, as healthy people’s episodic memories.  This suggests that the self operates as a powerful organizational structure whether for episodic memory or semantic memory.  It might be suggested that the organization of memory (facts of individual episodes) emerges from the self trying to interpret and organize the record of our experience. 
It should be noted that semantic autobiographical memories are viewed as a distinctly separate system from non-autobiographical semantic facts. Research has shown that amnesia can result in profound impairments to general semantic memory (such as animal names) whilst semantic knowledge about the self remains intact (Klein et al., 2002a; Klein et al., 1996; Klein et al., 2002b). Furthermore, research on the self-reference effect (Rogers et al., 1977; Symons & Johnson, 1997) has shown that information encoded in relation to the self is better recalled than other types of semantic information, and that self-referential encoding engages different brain regions to semantic non-self encoding (Wagner et al., 1998). A review of awareness of self in brain damage (Feinberg, 2001) has revealed that a notion of personal identity can persist despite extensive neural and cognitive dysfunction, leading Klein, Rozendal and Cosmides (2002) to propose that the self is ‘special’ and that self-knowledge structures may exist that are entirely separate to semantic and autobiographical memory.  
The point at which autobiographical semantic memory becomes ‘special’ (as there is a difference between knowing you went to school in London, and knowing you are optimistic) is harder to judge. Research has shown that semantic dementia patients have better semantic memory for autobiographically significant celebrities than that for celebrities that are not associated with autobiographically significant knowledge (Snowden et al., 1996), and, more recently, studies have shown that semantic concepts that are autobiographically significant are preferentially retrieved from long term memory (Westmacott & Moscovitch, 2003). Perhaps any autobiographical facts that enable one to maintain some stable sense of self will be preserved, but this is a matter for future investigation. 
The model depicted in Figure 5 is in partial agreement with the Multiple Trace Theory (MTT) account (Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; Nadel et al., 2000), which proposes that semantic and episodic retrieval rely on different structures. MTT proposes that episodic retrieval always relies on activation within medial temporal lobe structures (MTL), whilst semantic memory becomes independent of these brain regions. An interesting distinction in theories about self knowledge is relevant here. For a person to know that they possess a certain trait or self-image (if they were asked for example: Are you generous?), some theorists have proposed that an episodic retrieval process takes place, whereby people search for examples of a particular behaviour and compute their similarity to a given trait. This computational view (Bower & Gilligan, 1979) is contrasted with the abstraction view, in which personal traits are thought to be known through abstract representations of summary behaviours (Buss & Craik, 1983; Klein & Loftus, 1993). As Klein, Rozendal and Cosmides (2002) note, these two accounts of self-knowledge map neatly onto the episodic-semantic distinction, with the abstraction model drawing on semantic memory, and the computational account reliant on episodic processes. 
Future work could examine the contributions of semantic and episodic memories for self images using a modified TST (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) in both healthy and clinical populations. In a simple task, participants could be asked to list five I am statements, and then, for each in turn, spend 2 minutes writing how they justify that they are each identity. Subsequent coding could then investigate whether people tend to draw on other abstracted knowledge of the self (e.g. Buss and Craik, 1983), or episodic memories, when explaining knowledge about aspects of their sense of self. For example, the statement ‘I am generous’ could be known because the person states: ‘I always spend a lot on peoples’ presents.’ Alternatively, support for the self might be drawn from specific episodic incidents such as ‘I gave up my Saturday to help my boyfriend move house.’  It is likely that both elements will play a role in the maintenance of the self, indeed it is presumed that healthy individuals use both episodic and semantic memories to maintain a coherent and stable self (e.g. Addis and Tippett, 2008; Conway, 2005), but investigation of the relative contributions of both would prove interesting. A further issue for future consideration is how long-term PJM’s I am statements are. By following amnesic cases over time, it would be possible to examine whether the completion of the IAM Task, and similar identity measures, uses online computation or access to the long term self (Conway, 2005). One would expect that if access to the long term self was impaired, then online computation processes would take place and a different set of self statements would be given across different testing sessions. Previous research has already shown that normal populations tend to generate I am statements that are stable over time (Rathbone et al., 2008), thus this issue could be examined by follow up testing of past, present and future selves in denser amnesic cases.
Returning to some of the earliest work on this area, perhaps the key to understanding the impact of failures in episodic retrieval will be found in the investigation of how conscious re-experiencing of an event is lost (Claparède, 1911/1951; Kihlstrom, 1995). The knowledge of the self as a conscious experiencing ‘I’ can be retained in episodic dysfunction, but when event-specific details are lost, the ability to remember events in the past with a feeling of ‘me-ness’ is lost. We suggest here that the self can persist though semantic memory, but can one still experience the same kind of self–ness of those without episodic impairments? Does losing the ability to mentally time travel back to specific incidents in the past (the central tenet of episodic remembering; Tulving, 1983) profoundly affect the way we might view ourselves? For those who gradually lose their memories, both episodic and semantic, and remain unaware of their deficit (such as AD patients), the self does appear to suffer in terms of strength and quality (see Addis and Tippett, 2004). However, in this case, where episodic impairment is an isolated deficit, the experience of PJM suggests that the self can persist. 
Some previous research has shown deficits in self knowledge as a result of memory loss (e.g. Addis and Tippett, 2004; Miller et al., 2001), whereas there is little evidence for a similar pattern in PJM. The Alzheimer’s disease sample used in Addis and Tippett’s study would have differed in many ways to PJM, and thus there are many possible causes for the contrast in results.  Most strikingly, PJM was young at the time of her accident and it led to a very abrupt change in memory function.  People with Alzheimer's disease, in contrast, have a gradual decline in abilities, possibly with a long pre-clinical phase, and brain changes are less focal. Patients with frontotemporal dementia (FTD) have also been reported to show marked changes in self (Miller et al. 2001). In the case of FTD however, these changes may result from damage to the frontal lobe impairing the working self. The working self is considered to play an executive role, selecting and integrating memories (both episodic and semantic), and as such is linked with the executive functions of the frontal lobes. In the case of PJM, we speculate that the working self is unimpaired, but that access to episodic memories has been damaged. 
In conclusion, this case suggests that the self can be preserved (and measured) despite episodic impairments associated with amnesia. We suggest that the IAM Task provides a valuable tool by which to measure the relationship between memory and the self in neuropsychological groups. In particular, it could prove fruitful to revisit investigation of these concepts in Alzheimer’s patients, following the work of Addis and Tippett (2004) in this field.  In this case study, as with many others discussed (Evans et al., 1996; Klein et al., 1996; Klein et al., 2002b; Tulving, 1993; Wilson & Wearing, 1995), it appears that conceptual autobiographical knowledge can be used to support a sense of self. This is an individual with an island of amnesia. She shows continuity of self, but her memories are conceptual – they don’t show episodic detail. Nonetheless, it seems they are enough to maintain a coherent sense of self.  

References
Addis, D. R., & Tippett, L. J. (2004). Memory of myself: Autobiographical memory and identity in Alzheimer's disease. Memory, 12(1), 56-74.
Addis, D. R. & Tippett, L. J. (2008). The contributions of autobiographical memory to the content and continuity of identity. In F. Sani (Ed.), Self-Continuity: Individual and Collective Perspectives. (pp. 71-84). New York: Psychology Press.
Babinski, J. (1914). Contribution a l’etude des troubles mentaux dams l’hemiplegie organique cerebrale (anosognosie). Revue Neurologia, 22, 845-884.
Bower, G. H., & Gilligan, S. G. (1979). Remembering information related to ones-self. Journal of Research in Personality, 13(4), 420-432.
Burke, D.M., & Mackay, D.G. (1997). Memory, language and ageing. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 352 (1363), 1845–1856.
Buss, D. M., & Craik, K. H. (1983). The act frequency approach to personality. Psychological Review, 90(2), 105-126.
Cermak, L. S., & O'Connor, M. (1983). The anterograde and retrograde retrieval ability of a patient with amnesia due to encephalitis. Neuropsychologia, 21(3), 213-234.
Claparède, E. (1911/1951). Recognition et moiité. Archives de psychologie, 11, 79-90. In D. Rapaport (Ed.), Organisation and pathology of thought: Selected sources (pp. 58-75). New York: Columbia University Press.
Conway, M. A. (2005). Memory and the self. Journal Of Memory And Language, 53(4), 594-628.
Conway, M. A., & Fthenaki, A. (2003). Disruption of inhibitory control of memory following lesions to the frontal and temporal lobes. Cortex, 39(4-5), 667-686.
Conway, M. A., Gardiner, J. M., Perfect, T. J., Anderson, S. J., & Cohen, G. M. (1997). Changes in memory awareness during learning: The acquisition of knowledge by psychology undergraduates. Journal of Experimental Psychology-General, 126(4), 393-413.
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107(2), 261-288.
Conway, M. A., Singer, J.A., & Tagini, A. (2004). The self and autobiographical memory: Correspondence and coherence (​http:​/​​/​wos.isiknowledge.com:80​/​?SID=V2IIaHjaC24j1K5c8L8&Func=Abstract&doc=25​/​1​). Social Cognition, 22(5), 491-529.
Crovitz, H. F., & Schiffman, H. (1974). Frequency of episodic memories as a function of their age. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 4(NB5), 517-518.
Erikson, E. H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
Evans, J. J., Breen, E. K., Antoun, N., & Hodges, J. R. (1996). Focal retrograde amnesia for autobiographical events following cerebral vasculitis: A connectionist account. Neurocase, 2(1), 1-11.
Feinberg, T. E. (2001). Altered egos: How the brain creates the self. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fitzgerald, J.M. (1988). Vivid memories and the reminiscence phenomenon: The role of a self  narrative. Human Development, 31, 261-273.
Fitzgerald, J.M. (1992). Autobiographical memory and conceptualizations of the self. In M.A. Conway, D.C. Rubin, H. Spinnler & W.A.Wagenaar (Eds.), Theoretical Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory. (pp. 99-114). Dordrech: Kluwer.
Frank, A. W. (1995). The wounded storyteller. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jansari, A., & Parkin, A. J. (1996). Things that go bump in your life: Explaining the reminiscence bump in autobiographical memory. Psychology And Aging, 11(1), 85-91.
Kihlstrom, J. F. (1995). Memory and consciousness: An appreciation of Claparede and Recognition et Moiite. Consciousness and Cognition, 4(4), 379-386.
Kihlstrom, J. F., Beer, J. S., & Klein, S. B. (2002). Self and identity as memory. (2002). Handbook of Self and Identity (pp. 2068-2090).
Klein, S. B., Cosmides, L., Costabile, K. A., & Mei, L. (2002a). Is there something special about the self? A neuropsychological case study. Journal Of Research In Personality, 36(5), 490-506.
Klein, S. B., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1986). Elaboration, organization, and the self-reference effect in memory. Journal Of Experimental Psychology-General, 115(1), 26-38.
Klein, S. B., & Loftus, J. (1993). Behavioral experience and trait judgments about the self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19(6), 740-745.
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (1996). Self-knowledge of an amnesic patient: Toward a neuropsychology of personality and social psychology. Journal Of Experimental Psychology-General, 125(3), 250-260.
Klein, S. B., Rozendal, K., & Cosmides, L. (2002b). A social-cognitive neuroscience analysis of the self. Social Cognition, 20(2), 105-135.
Knell, R. (2007). Traumatic realism? Psychologist, 20(4), 264-264.
Kopelman, M. D., Wilson, B. A., & Baddeley, A. D. (1989). The autobiographical memory interview - a new assessment of autobiographical and personal semantic memory in amnesic patients. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 11(5), 724-744.
Kuhn, M. H., & McPartland, T. S. (1954). An empirical investigation of self-attitudes. American Sociological Review, 19(1), 68-76.
Lemogne, C., Piolino, P., Friszer, S., Claret, A., Girault, N., Jouvent, R., Allilaire, J., & Fossati, P. (2006). Episodic autobiographical memory in depression: Specificity, autonoetic consciousness and self-perspective. Consciousness and Cognition, 15, 258-268.
Locke, J. (1694/1975). An essay concerning human understanding. In J. Perry (Ed.), Personal Identity. Berkeley: University of California Press.
McCarthy, R. A., & Hodges, J. R. (1995). Trapped in time: Profound autobiographical memory loss following a thalamic stroke. In R. Campbell & M. A. Conway (Eds.), Broken memories: Case studies in memory impairment (pp. 31-44). Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
Medved, M. I., & Brockmeier, J. (2008). Continuity amid chaos: Neurotrauma, loss of memory, and sense of self. Qualitative Health Research, 18(4), 469-479.
Miller, B. L., Seeley, W. W., Mychack, P., Rosen, H. J., Mena, I., & Boone, K. (2001). Neuroanatomy of the self - evidence from patients with frontotemporal dementia. Neurology, 57(5), 817-821.
Nadel, L., & Moscovitch, M. (1997). Memory consolidation, retrograde amnesia and the hippocampal complex. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 7(2), 217-227.
Nadel, L., Samsonovich, A., Ryan, L., & Moscovitch, M. (2000). Multiple trace theory of human memory: Computational, neuroimaging, and neuropsychological results. Hippocampus, 10(4), 352-368.
Nochi, M. (1998). "loss of self" in the narratives of people with traumatic brain injuries: A qualitative analysis. Social Science and Medicine, 46, 869-878.
Piolino, P., Desgranges, B., Clarys, D., Guillery-Girard, B., Taconnat, L., Isingrini, M., et al. (2006). Autobiographical memory, autonoetic consciousness, and self-perspective in aging. Psychology and Aging, 21(3), 510-525.
Rathbone, C. J., Moulin, C. J. A., & Conway, M. A. (2008). Self-centred memories: The reminiscence bump and the self. Memory and Cognition, 36(8), 1403-1414.
Rogers, T. B., Kuiper, N. A., & Kirker, W. S. (1977). Self-reference and encoding of personal information. Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology, 35(9), 677-688.
Rosenbaum, R. S., Kohler, S., Schacter, D. L., Moscovitch, M., Westmacott, R., Black, S. E., et al. (2005). The case of KC: Contributions of a memory-impaired person to memory theory. Neuropsychologia, 43(7), 989-1021.
Rubin, D.C., & Greenberg, D.L., (1998).  Visual memory-deficit amnesia: A distinct amnesicpresentation and etiology. PNAS, 95 (9), 5413-5416.
Rubin, D. C., Rahhal, T. A., & Poon, L. W. (1998). Things learned in early adulthood are remembered best. Memory & Cognition, 26(1), 3-19.
Rubin, D. C., Wetzler, S. E., & Nebes, R. D. (1986). Autobiographical memory across the adult lifespan. In D. C. Rubin (Ed.), Autobiographical memory (pp. 202-221). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rybash, J. M., & Monaghan, B. E. (1999). Episodic and semantic contributions to older adults' autobiographical recall. Journal Of General Psychology, 126(1), 85-96.
Seashore, C. E., Lewis, D., & Saetveit, D. L. (1960). Seashore measures of musical talents (Vol. rev.edn). New York: Psychological Corporation.
Singer, J. A. (1998). Applying a systems framework to self-defining memories. Psychological Inquiry, 9(2), 161-164.
Snowden, J. S., Griffiths, H. L., & Neary, D. (1996). Semantic-episodic memory interactions in semantic dementia: Implications for retrograde memory function. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 13(8), 1101-1137.
Symons, C. S., & Johnson, B. T. (1997). The self-reference effect in memory: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 121(3), 371-394.
Tulving, E. (1983). Elements of episodic memory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Tulving, E. (1993). Self-knowledge of an amnesic individual is represented abstractly. In T. K. Srull & R. S. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 5). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Tulving, E. & Pearlston, Z. (1966). Availability versus accessibility of information in memory for words. H\Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 5, 381-391.
Tulving, E., Schacter, D. L., McLachlan, D. R., & Moscovitch, M. (1988). Priming of semantic autobiographical knowledge - a case-study of retrograde-amnesia. Brain and Cognition, 8(1), 3-20.
Wagner, A. D., Desmond, J. E., Glover, G. H., & Gabrieli, J. D. E. (1998). Prefrontal cortex and recognition memory - functional-MRI evidence for context-dependent retrieval processes. Brain, 121, 1985-2002.
Wechsler, D. (1945). A standardized memory scale for clinical use. Journal of Psychology, 19(87-95).
Wechsler, D. (1981). Manual for the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-revised. New York: The Psychological Corp.
Westmacott, R., & Moscovitch, M. (2003). The contribution of autobiographical significance to semantic memory. Memory & Cognition, 31(5), 761-774.
Wheeler, M. A., & McMillan, C. T. (2001). Focal retrograde amnesia and the episodic-semantic distinction. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 1(1), 22-36.
Wheeler, M. A., Stuss, D. T., & Tulving, E. (1997). Toward a theory of episodic memory: The frontal lobes and autonoetic consciousness. Psychological Bulletin, 121(3), 331-354.
Wilson, B. A., Baddeley, A. D., & Kapur, N. (1995). Dense amnesia in a professional musician following herpes-simplex virus encephalitis. Journal Of Clinical And Experimental Neuropsychology, 17(5), 668-681.






The authors wish to thank PJM and her husband, for all the time and effort they generously gave in helping us with this research. Thanks also to Pam Blundell, who introduced us to PJM and enabled this research to take place, and to the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. This work was supported by an ESRC 1+3 studentship (PTA-031-2005-00309) held by Clare J. Rathbone and benefits from discussion at an ESRC Franco-British Collaborative Workshop held by Chris J.A. Moulin (RES-170-25-0008). The manuscript was prepared while Clare J. Rathbone was undertaking a visiting academic fellowship at the Rotman Research Institute in Toronto, Canada.

Table 1
Neuropsychological Test Results (11/2005, 09/2006) 
Function 	Test	PJM Score
Pre-morbid intellectual functioning	WTAR	120
	   Est FIQ	116
Intellectual ability	WAIS-III (UK)	
	   Similarities	8
	   Arithmetic	12
	   Digit Span	13
	   Picture Completion	7
	   Raven’s Matrices	14
Learning and Memory	WMS III	
	   Logical Memory 1	8
	   Faces Recognition 1	6
	   Verbal Paired Associates 1	6
	   Letter N-S	8
	   Logical Memory II	8
	   Faces Recognition II	9
	   Verbal Paired Associates II	6
	   Auditory Recognition	8
Executive function	Trail Making Test	
	   A	57s
	   B	105s
	Hayling Scaled Scores	
	   Total	6 (Average)
	   Brixton	7 (High Average)
	BADS	
	   Rule Shift Card	4
	   Action Programme	4
	   Key Search	4
	   Temporal Judgement	0
	   Zoo Map	2
	   Modified Six Elements	4
	   Total Profile Score	18
	   Standardised Score	100 (Average)















PJM and mean control memory ratings in the Crovtiz-Schiffman task











Fig. 1: Lifespan retrieval curve drawn by PJM to reflect ease of memory retrieval across the lifespan
Fig. 2: Graph to show proportional lifespan distribution of memories retrieved in Crovitz-Schiffman Task
Fig. 3: Graph to show proportion of memories recalled in epochs around age of self emergence in IAM Task
Fig. 4: Graph to show emergence of selves across the lifespan





































































^1	  Headway is a registered charity which provides support for brain injury survivors, their families and carers.
